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Abstract: Samuel Lebens and Tyron Goldschmidt provided original theodicies, which suggest that at one 
time God will change the past, either by erasing/substituting the sins of humans or erasing the whole entirety 
of evils. Both theodicies imply the idea that God can completely change the past without leaving any traces. 
In this paper, I argue that Lebens’ and Goldschmidt’s preferred model, which they call the scene-changing 
theory, is problematic. First, its complex metaphysical foundation could be replaced with presentism 
(roughly, the view in the ontology of time that only present things exist) without losing any substantial 
heuristics. Second, their theory either implies a controversial theory of truthmaking under presentistic and 
hyper-presentistic ontology or implies controversial views on the counting of events under presentistic and 
hyper-presentistic ontology. Thirdly, I will argue that any theory of elimination/substitution of evils of the 
past implies that there are unnecessary evils, which is inconsistent with God’s goodness.
Keywords: the problem of evil, God, necessary evil, eternalism, presentism, moving spotlight theory, 
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1  Introduction
Philosophy of time is a fast-growing branch of contemporary metaphysics, which affects many philosophical 
fields, and the philosophy of religion is not an exclusion. Recently, Samuel Lebens and Tyron Goldschmidt 
provided two original theodicies, which are based on the developments of contemporary metaphysics of 
time. In a nutshell, their basic idea is that at one time God will change the past either by erasing/substituting 
the sins of humans or erasing the whole entirety of evils.1 Both theodicies imply that God can completely 
change the past without leaving any traces. This possibility of those theodicies is justified under two 
metaphysical models, which they develop. In this paper, I argue that Lebens’ and Goldschmidt’s preferred 
model, which they call the scene-changing theory,2 is problematic. Firstly, its complex metaphysical 
foundation could be replaced with presentism (roughly, the view in the ontology of time, that only present 
things exist3) without losing any substantial heuristics. Second, their theory implies either a controversial 
theory of truthmaking under presentistic and hyper-presentistic ontology or controversial views on the 
counting of events under presentistic and hyper-presentistic ontology. Thirdly, I will argue that any theory 
of elimination/substitution of evils of the past implies that there are unnecessary evils, which is inconsistent 
with God’s goodness.
1 Lebens and Goldschmidt, “The Promise of a New Past”, 1–25.
2 Ibid., 9.
3 Sider, “Presentism and Ontological Commitment”, 325-347.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 3/4/20 8:16 PM
168   B. V. Faul 
In the first part, I will present two theodicies, the metaphysical possibility of which Lebens and 
Goldschmidt want to justify. In the second part, I will explicate the metaphysical structure of the scene-
changing theory. In the third part, I will demonstrate how the scene-changing theory is supposed to justify 
the theodicies in question. Then, I will lay down the criticism of the scene-changing theory. In the last part, 
I will argue that any theodicy which implies that evils will be eliminated in a complete way is inconsistent 
with God’s goodness.
2  The Two Theodicies
Samuel Lebens and Tyron Goldschmidt address the problem of evil in the line of two Jewish traditions. 
They introduce two theodicies from these traditions and justify their metaphysical possibility based on 
contemporary developments in the metaphysics of time. The first theodicy is represented by Rabbi Tzadok 
HaKohen. Lebens and Goldschmidt interpret it in the following way: one day God will erase all human sins 
or substitute them with something that is not sinful. They call this theodicy the Ultimate Forgiveness.4 The 
second theodicy is represented by Rabbi Mordechai Yosef Leiner, and it is called No More Evil.5 According to 
No More Evil, one day God will eliminate all evils from the past, both moral and natural.
Even though Ultimate Forgiveness and No More Evil differ in details, there is an important commonality 
between them: they imply that God can change the past without leaving any traces. Lebens and Goldschmidt 
justify the metaphysical possibility for God to change the past without leaving any traces (and, thus, the 
metaphysical possibility of Ultimate Forgiveness and No More Evil) by introducing two metaphysical models. 
The first model is called the supertask model. The second model is called the scene-changing theory. Lebens 
and Goldschmidt explicitly prefer the scene-changing theory, the analysis of which is the primal aim of this 
paper. To understand how exactly the scene-changing theory works, let us firstly explicate its metaphysical 
assumptions.
3  Underlying Metaphysics
The dominant understanding of omnipotence in theology is that God can do only what is logically possible. 
So, is it logically possible for God to completely change the past, specifically, to make it the case that sin did 
not occur, or that evils did not occur? Tyron and Goldschmidt introduce the “scene-changing theory”, which, 
as they believe, suffices for such possibilities.6 Let us first concentrate on the metaphysical foundations of 
the scene-changing theory.
This theory has two basic metaphysical assumptions:
1. The moving spotlight theory is true.
2. Hyper-presentism is true.7
According to the moving spotlight theory, past, present and future events exist in a robust sense. The 
universe is a four-dimensional manifold, which contains all events that happen, happened or will happen. 
Thus, the propositions about the past, present, and future do not float ungrounded, they are made true by 
the real state of affairs, which exists simpliciter. For example, the proposition that the Second World War 
started in 1939 is made true by the fact, that there exists an event “the beginning of the Second World War”, 
which is located in 1939. In this respect, “the beginning of the Second World War” exists in the same way as 
4 Lebens and Goldschmidt, “The Promise of a New Past”, 1.
5 Ibid., 2.
6 I believe, that the “supertask model” (which is the first model they introduce) is more convincing in this respect. However, 
I will not focus on it here.
7 For simplicity of the narrative, I put the hyper-presentism into the structure of the scene-changing theory. Lebens and 
Goldschmidt, however, discuss hyper-presentism as something additional to the scene-changing theory. This difference is not 
substantial and all the points of this paper might be reformulated in original terminology, which, however, will make this paper 
heavier and less comprehensible.
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tables and chairs, as some philosophers prefer to put it. The spotlight theory also suggests that the present 
is ontologically different from the past and future. Its differentiating feature is that present has the property 
of “being the present”, rather than “being the past” or “being the future”.8 Thus, the moving spotlight 
theory is something between eternalism, which accepts the existence of space-time manifold, but denies 
the change in this manifold;9 and presentism, which accepts change, but denies the existence of space-
time manifold, as, according to presentism, only present things exist.10 In the moving-spotlight theory, the 
whole four-dimensional manifold changes its properties “over time”, as different parts of it gain and lose 
the property of being the present.11
To explain a change in the space-time manifold, some philosophers postulate the existence of hypertime. 
Hypertime is an additional time dimension, “where” the change of the whole space-time manifold occurs. 
To illustrate it, imagine that there is a hyper-temporal creature that observes the space-time manifold “from 
the outside”, and this creature can identify the property of “being the present”. What it sees is that this 
property is moving from past events to future events, where every single moment a new part of the manifold 
acquires a property of “being the present”, while the previous parts of the manifold acquire a property of 
“being the past”. Thus, the space-time manifold is presented to this creature as an object which changes 
as time goes by, as regular changing objects are presented to us. However, for this creature change occurs 
not in a time where the space-time manifoldians live in, as they live in the manifold itself. The “place” 
where this creature observes the change in the manifold is located in the second time-dimension, which is 
sometimes called a hyper-temporal dimension.
As with the first time-dimension, we can raise the question about the nature of the second time-
dimension, and there are also lots of possibilities there: it may be true that this second time-dimension 
is also a space-time manifold without any change in it, or the spotlight theory might be true about this 
second time dimension, etc. The second assumption of the scene-changing theory is that presentism is true 
about hypertime. In other words, in hypertime only hyper-present things and events exist,12 where hyper-
past and hyper-future things and events do not exist. This is called hyper-presentism, and it raises the 
same problems as “regular” presentism does. One of the main problems is the truth-maker problem, which 
is the question about the facts, which make the propositions about the hyper-past or hyper-future true. 
Lebens and Goldschmidt adopt the theory which is mainly defended by Dean Zimmerman.13 According to 
Zimmerman, given the truth of the regular presentism, what makes the propositions about the past and the 
future true is that the present, which exists, instantiate backward and forward-looking properties, which 
make it true that something was or will be the case. This suffices for what might be called the “minimal 
grounding principle”, which says that any proposition with truth-value must be grounded in something 
that exists, either abstract or concrete. Lebens and Goldschmidt accept Zimmerman’s theory for hyper-
presentism. Thus, the facts about hyper-past and hyper-future are grounded in hyper-present, which 
instantiate hyper-backward and hyper-forward-looking properties.
4  Details of the Scene-Changing Theory
It is now clear what is the metaphysical structure of reality, which is accepted by Lebens and Goldschmidt 
to argue for the possibility of the “scene-changing theory” to be true. They accept the spotlight-theory for 
the first time-dimension, presentism for the second time-dimension, and adopt the minimal grounding 
8 There is a problem of specification what is the nature of the differentiating feature of the present, but I am not going to discuss 
it in this paper.
9 Defenders of eternalism include Smart, “Philosophy and Scientific Realism”; Mellor, “Real Time II”; Sider, “Four-
Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time”.
10 Defenders of presentism include Prior, “Changes in events and changes in things”; Bigelow, “Presentism and properties”; 
Zimmerman, “The Privileged Present: Defending an ‘A-Theory’ of Time”. 
11 Defenders of the moving spotlight theory include Sullivan, “The minimal A-theory”; Deasy, “The Moving Spotlight Theory”.
12 There is a controversy on how to formulate presentism. For a very useful discussion see Deasey, “What is presentism?”.
13 Zimmerman, “The Privileged Present: Defending an ‘A-Theory’ of Time”, 211–225.
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principle by accepting that hyper-temporal present instantiate hyper-backward and hyper-forward-looking 
properties, which make the propositions about the past and the future true or false. Let us now concentrate 
on how exactly God can change the past in such a world from Lebens’ and Goldschmidt’s perspective.
Obviously, God can change the past in the “first time-dimensional” space-time manifold. Imagine that 
at ht1 (hypertime 1) the space-time manifold contains evils. At ht2, God makes it the case that some or all 
evils are not contained in the space-time manifold. So, if there were a hyper-temporal creature, it would 
observe that at ht2 the evil parts of the space-time manifold were cut off or replaced with good facts. Now, 
it seems that there is nothing which makes it true that the world contained evil, as in the spotlight theory 
the nature of time is such that the propositions about the past are made true by the existing events, which 
do not exist anymore at ht2. It is easy to illustrate this point with an example: Imagine that a pencil at t1 has 
two parts, the left part is red, and the right part is green, and that presentism is true about the time where 
we live in. At t1 a pencil has both parts, but at t2 the red part is cut off. It is correct to say that at t2 the pencil 
has only green parts, it is made true by the structure of the pencil at t2.
Thus, we can see how the scene-changing theory makes, according to Lebens and Goldschmidt, Ultimate 
Forgiveness and No More Evil metaphysically possible. Consider Ultimate Forgiveness. God changes the past 
in the first time-dimension (for which the spotlight theory is true) and either erases all human sins from 
the entire history of the world or substitutes them with something non-sinful. In both cases, God has to 
make the history causally coherent and to preserve human freedom. The second time-dimension, for which 
presentism is true, remains untouched.
The same works for the No More Evil. In this case, God changes the past by erasing all evils from the first 
time-dimension, while the second time-dimension also remains untouched. In both cases, after erasing/
substituting human sins or eliminating all evils, the structure of the first time-dimension is such that there 
are no relevant evils anymore (either moral or both moral and natural evils), as there are no red parts of the 
pencil. In the next section, I am going to provide a deeper analysis of the scene-changing theory.
5  Objections to the Metaphysical Theory
Returning to an example with the pencil, it is correct to say that even though the pencil does not have a red 
part at t2, it had a red part. In this case, the red part was not eliminated from history without any traces. To 
make it the case that pencil has never had red parts, it is necessary to alter the reality in such a way as to 
make the proposition “the pencil had red parts” false.
The basic problem of which Lebens and Goldschmidt are aware is the same. It seems that “eliminated” 
evils seem to exist in the hyper-past. If it is the case, then the proposition that evil events hyper-existed is 
true, and this is not a genuine elimination of evil. And here is the crucial point that Lebens and Goldschmidt 
make: the propositions about hyper-past are true only de-dicto, they are not true de-re, which makes the 
elimination of evils a genuine elimination.14
The problem with this idea is that it is not completely clear what Lebens and Goldschmidt mean when 
they say that it is de-dicto true that the evil hyper-existed, as this was not sufficiently discussed by them. 
Are not we interested in whether it is plainly true or false that evils hyper-existed after God eliminates 
them? I believe that our basic concern is whether it is metaphysically true or false that evil hyper-existed 
after God eliminates it, and, as far as I understand, Lebens and Goldschmidt are also primarily interested 
in it. Further, I will illustrate that any interpretation of what happens in reality after God eliminates evil is 
problematic for the metaphysical foundation of the scene-changing theory.
There are three possible truth values which the proposition that evil hyper-existed can have: true, false 
or undefined (I am not going to discuss the last possibility because there are no sufficient correlations with 
the Lebens’ and Goldschmidt’s text, and most of what I will discuss is also applicable to an “undefined” 
possibility). Now and further I will concentrate specifically on the complete elimination of evils made by 
God (in other words, I will focus on No More Evil). However, what I discuss in this chapter is also applicable 
14 Lebens and Goldschmidt, “The Promise of a New Past”, 10.
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(with necessary alterations) to any theory which shares the metaphysical foundation of the scene-changing 
theory, and presupposes that it is possible to change the past (not necessarily involving God’s acts), 
including Ultimate Forgiveness.
If the proposition that evils hyper-existed is true, then evil hyper-took place and there is no genuine 
elimination of evils. If we accept the minimal grounding principle (that there must exist something in the world 
which makes all propositions with truth values true or false), then there exists something in the world which 
makes it true that evil hyper-existed. Even if the nature of the thing which makes the propositions about hyper-
past events true or false is different from what makes the propositions about existing objects true or false, it still 
suffices. Thus, it is the case that evil hyper-existed, which is not a genuine elimination of evil. So, if after the 
Eschaton the proposition “there hyper-was evil” is true, then there simply hyper-was evil, and it is not an act of 
genuine elimination of evils. In this case, it is as hard to argue that the world as a whole does not contain evil, as 
it is true that evil hyper-existed, which means that hyper-past evils are in the history of our world.
Consider the second option, that “evil hyper-existed” is false. It is possible to affirm that the world 
contains the hyper-backward-looking property that evil existed, and yet, there is nothing evil in this hyper-
backward-looking property in itself, which means that evil was truly eliminated.15 In this case, the fact 
that evil hyper-existed is not sufficient for the world to contain evil. For the sake of the argument, let us 
suppose that it is the case. The most noticeable thing is that the hyper-forward and hyper-backward-looking 
properties are not functioning as truthmakers in this case, which makes the postulation of these properties 
redundant. If they are, nevertheless, functioning as truthmakers, then it is plainly true that evil hyper-
existed and we return to the “first option”, which I discussed in the previous paragraph. But there are 
further problems as well. In the model provided by Lebens and Goldschmidt, God eliminates evil from 
the first time-dimension, without eliminating evil from the hypertime. Call the act of eliminating evil the 
“evil eliminating act”. Thus, in Lebens’ and Goldschmidt’s model the evil eliminating act is done only in 
the first-time dimension (for which the spotlight theory is true), while the second time-dimension (hyper-
presentistic dimension) remains untouched. Hypertime deals with evil with its own resources. If this is true 
about hypertime, I will argue, it would mean that regular presentism (first time-dimension-presentism) 
would suffice for eliminating evils without any special evil eliminating act.
Imagine that presentism about the first time-dimension is true, and there is no any hyper-temporal 
dimension. Imagine that after the Eschaton, there will be no concrete instantiations of evil in the present. 
If presentism is true and the backward-looking property of the world “evil took place” is not functioning 
as truthmaker, then after the Eschaton there will be no evil, and no special evil eliminating act by God is 
required. Thus, in this case, 1) the postulation of hyper-backward and hyper-forward-looking properties 
is redundant; 2) regular presentism is as sufficient for Ultimate Forgiveness and No More Evil, as the 
metaphysical basis of the scene-changing theory; 3) given that regular presentism is true, no evil eliminating 
act is required after the Eschaton.
The next option is that after the evil eliminating act, it is true that evils hyper-existed, but this is 
somehow not sufficient for the world in general to contain evils. The only possible explanation of this is 
that when we count evils in our world, we do not count evils that hyper-was or hyper-will be the case. This is 
problematic because when we count evils under regularly presentistic ontology, we count not only present 
evils but also evils that were or will be the case. If the regular presentism were true and we asked God after 
the Eschaton whether our world is an evil-containing world, He would have answered: “Of course, there 
were many evils”. If He answered: “No, presentism is true and now there are no evils present, even though 
there were many evils. Remember, past evils do not count”, it would mean that there is something wrong 
with our basic idea of counting of events, including evils.
I believe that this interpretation of the counting of evils seems to be problematic when transposed into 
regular presentistic ontology. Call it the unintuitive evil quantification (UEQ): “all evils” is interpreted as 
“present evils”. Under this interpretation of counting it is not very hard to eliminate all evils, as changing of 
the past is not necessary for it. Thus, we can see that under the truth of UEQ, the regular presentism would 
suffice and no evil eliminating act by God is needed after the Eschaton.
15 Ibid., 10–11.
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But what about hyper-presentism? It is possible to argue that somehow UEQ is false for regular presentism 
but true for the hyper-presentism. It would mean that when we count evils in the regular presentism, we 
interpret the quantifier “all” in “all evils” as counting past, present and future evils. However, in the hyper-
presentism, the quantifier “all” in “all evils” counts only hyper-present evils. If this is the case, then hyper-
presentism would be sufficient for eliminating evils with its own resources after the Eschaton and the evil 
eliminating act in the first time-dimension.
However, what is the substantial difference between presentism and the hyper-presentism, which 
justifies these different standards of quantification? It seems that such a distinction might not be motivated 
independently from defending the scene-changing theory. If such an exclusive status of hyper-presentism 
is not justified, then Lebens and Goldschmidt face the problem of defending a counterintuitive theory 
of counting of evils both in regular presentism and in the hyper-presentism. If Lebens and Goldschmidt 
would justify UEQ without justifying the exclusive status of hypertime with respect to it, then the regular 
presentism is a better metaphysics: under the truth of the regular presentism, after the Eschaton the evil 
events of the past would not count, and no evil eliminating act is required.
Let us summarize the problems of this interpretation: 1) the procedure of counting evil events in hyper-
presentistic time-dimension is peculiar and requires additional defense; 2) under this theory of counting 
of events, the regular presentism (which is simpler) is as sufficient for Ultimate Forgiveness and No More 
Evil as the scene-changing theory; 3) given this theory of counting of events, under the truth of regular 
presentism no special evil-eliminating act is required by God after the Eschaton.
Another way to affirm that evil never hyper-existed after the Eschaton is to argue that God can eliminate 
the hyper-backward-looking property that the world hyper-contained evil. Under the truth of the scene 
changing theory, it involves two evil eliminating acts: 1) Erasing the concrete evils from the first time-
dimension; 2) Erasing the evil hyper-backward-looking properties of the world.
First, in this case, regular presentism would suffice. If God can erase the hyper-backward-looking 
property of the world, He can erase the evil-backward-looking properties in the regularly presentistic 
world. Thus, if God can erase backward-looking properties in general, then, ceteris paribus, presentism 
is a better option than the metaphysical basis of the scene changing theory, which is the combination of 
spotlight theory and hyper-presentism. Second, for hyper-backward-looking properties to be truthmakers, 
they must have a necessary connection of some sort with what has actually hyper-happened. If God erases 
those properties, then it has never hyper-happened that evil occurred. However, if evil occurs right now, 
then some further time (or hypertime, etc.) will necessarily instantiate backward (or hyper-backward, etc.)-
looking property that evil existed (or hyper-existed, etc.). This option is not coherent to accept in the first 
place if we believe that there are evils right now. Thus, this strategy implies two consequences: 1) It is not 
possible to erase backward-looking properties in presentism (or hyper-presentism) without denying that 
the connection between events that had happened and the backward-looking properties of the present 
is necessary (it raises many difficulties on how exactly to formulate this connection, but it is not an aim 
of this paper); 2) Even if it would be possible to erase those properties, or this connection turns out to 
be not necessary, or it is impossible to coherently formulate it, regular presentism would suffice as much 
as the metaphysical foundation of the scene-changing theory, moreover, it would require only one evil 
eliminating act, instead of two.
At this point, we can see that if the proposition that the world contained (or hyper-contained, etc.) 
evil is true after the evil eliminating act, then it is a failed evil eliminating act. If it is false, then the regular 
presentism is as sufficient, as the metaphysical basis of the scene changing theory, and under the truth 
of the regular presentism, no evil eliminating act is needed. Moreover, in this case, hyper-backward and 
hyper-forward-looking properties of the hyper-present are redundant. Another possibility is that there 
hyper-was evils (after the Eschaton and the evil eliminating act), but those evils do not count as evils and 
they do not “leave traces”. This implies an unintuitive idea of counting of evils in hypertime, which requires 
an additional defense. Moreover, given that this idea of counting is justified in general, presentism is as 
sufficient, as the metaphysical basis of the scene-changing theory, while not requiring any evil eliminating 
act. The last option requires the evil eliminating act to be performed both in the first and in the second 
time-dimensions. This strategy implies that the connection between past events and what makes it true 
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that they happened is not necessary, which is a serious claim, requiring an additional defense. Even if this 
connection is not necessary or cannot be coherently formulated, then regular presentism is as sufficient as 
a metaphysical basis of the scene-changing theory. We can see that all interpretations imply difficulties for 
the scene-changing theory. Either evil eliminating act is a failed evil eliminating act, or regular presentism 
is a better option as it is metaphysically simpler and does not involve evil eliminating act. However, in 
this case, the theory faces either problematic metaphysical assumptions on truthmaking in presentism (or, 
hyper-presentism) or problematic theory of counting of evils.
6  Necessary Evils
 All previous objections might be reformulated and applied to any theory which presupposes the metaphysical 
basis of the scene-changing theory, and presupposes that the past can be changed without leaving any 
traces. I am going to make a further objection to any theory which presupposes that God specifically can 
eliminate evils from the past no matter the underlying metaphysical foundations. This objection is related 
to notions of necessary evils and God’s goodness, and I am going to argue that if God can erase/substitute 
evils from the past, preserving all good consequences of evils, then the evils of the world are not justified 
and, thus, God is not fully good. To put it differently, successful Ultimate Forgiveness or No More Evil is not 
compatible with God’s goodness.
Consider the claim “The fact that evil E happened is a necessary condition for some further good G 
to happen”. If E is a necessary condition for G to happen, then it is impossible for G to happen without E 
having happened. If we believe that the omnipotent being can do only what is logically possible, then it 
is impossible for an omnipotent being to make G happen, without E having happened, given that E is a 
necessary condition for G to happen. Imagine that after the Eschaton God somehow erases all evils without 
leaving any traces. After the Eschaton, it is true that evil never occurred in our world. Consider two worlds 
W1 and W2. In W1, evil has happened and God completely eliminated it after the Eschaton. In W2, God 
created the world which is the same as W1 after the Eschaton, but without the evil eliminating act. As we 
can see, the fact that evil never occurred is true in both worlds. So, there is no real difference between those 
worlds with respect to evils. The difference is that in W1 the evil eliminating act took place, and in W2 it did 
not. Imagine that God will eliminate all evils someday, and we experience evils now. In this case, it would 
be simultaneously true that there is no difference with respect to evils in W1 and W2, and yet, the difference 
is that we experience evils in W1, and not experience it in W2. This seeming incoherence is another way 
to put one of the latest objections from the previous part of this paper, but for the sake of the argument, 
imagine that it is not incoherent to believe it. It would mean that God can achieve the same consequences 
(Eschaton, in our example) without us experiencing any evils in this world. Thus, all the evils of the world 
are not necessary evils. But God’s goodness requires Him to avoid the occurrence of not necessary evils, and 
He can do so, as He is omnipotent. If it is so, and God does not avoid the occurrence of unnecessary evils 
(and all evils are unnecessary), then He is not fully good (and if God’s goodness is essential to Him, then 
God does not exist).
Let us concentrate on No More Evil. We can see, that the evil eliminating act requires all evils not 
to be necessary for Eschaton, and it is hard to see how God could be justified in permitting those evils 
in the first place. If some evils are necessary for the whole state of affairs after the Eschaton, then it 
is impossible to make it the case that those evils did not exist. It means that even if there exists one 
evil, which is necessary for the state of affairs after the Eschaton, then the evil eliminating act will 
never occur, as it requires all evils to be eliminated. Thus, if some evils are necessary for the state of 
affairs after the Eschaton, then the complete evil eliminating act is impossible. If there are no evils, 
which are necessary for the state of affairs after the Eschaton, then all of the evils are not justified, 
which contradicts the goodness of God. The same works for the Ultimate Forgiveness. If all moral evils 
could be eliminated or substituted after the Eschaton, then those moral evils are not necessary for the 
Eschaton. It means that there are unnecessary evils, which contradicts the goodness of God, as He 
could have created the world after the Eschaton without them.
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7  Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that even if Lebens’ and Goldschmidt’s metaphysics, which underlie the scene 
changing theory is sufficient for genuine evil eliminating/substituting act (and for any change of the past), 
it could be replaced with regular presentism without losing any substantial heuristics. However, both 
presentism and the metaphysical basis of the scene-changing theory is problematic in this respect. Under 
one of the interpretations, their theory implies that backward and hyper-backward-looking properties 
are not functioning as truthmakers. The second possible interpretation implies a very controversial and 
counterintuitive theory of counting of events under presentism or hyper-presentism. In the last section 
of the paper, I argued that any successful theory of evil elimination/substitution made by God faces the 
problem that there are evils in the world that are not necessary, which contradicts to the goodness of God, 
as He could have created the world “after the Eschaton” without them. Thus, No More Evil and Ultimate 
Forgiveness seem to be problematic in the first place, given that God is fully good.16
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